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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ENID ALLEN,

Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 15415

vs.

GREYHOUND LINES , INC. ,
a corpora ti on,
Defendant/Respondent.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a case for personal injuries allegedly sustained
by the Plaintiff in Pocatello, Idaho on January 27, 1974 while

she

was

a passenger on a Greyhound Bus which was traveling from

Ogden, Utah to Dillon, Montana.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After trial before the court, the District Judge, the
Honorable Ronald
of

Law

o.

Hyde, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions

and Judgment for the Defendant.

The court found that

Plaintiff's claim was barred by the provisions of Section 5-219(4)
Idaho Code Annotated, and therefore by the relevant provisions of
Section 78-12-45 Utah Code Annotated.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant prays that the judgment of the District Court
be affirmed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant agrees with most of Plaintiff's
Facts.

s tatement o:

There are, however, several statements that deserve ch:'

ification and elaboration:
1.

Plaintiff claims on pages 4 through 5 of her brief

that it was never her intent to remain indefinitely in Montana.
This unsupported allegation is in direct conflict with the recc:
In its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, the trial cour:
found:

12. Plaintiff and her husband moved from Ogden
Utah to Dillon, Montana in August of 1972 to manage'
and operate the motel business. At that time they ,
had an intention to remain in Montana for an indefinite
period of time.
(R. at 127)
13. The management and operation of the motel
required that plaintiff and her husband live in Dillon
and be engaged full time in that business activity.
However, they could have hired someone else to
manage and operate the motel. Before and after they
moved to Montana they have had the intention to manage
and operate the motel and reside in the motel for an
indefinite period of time.
(R. at 127)

* * *
24. Plaintiff claims she will return to Ogden,
Utah at some indefinite time in the future to reside.
She also claims she will continue to reside for an
indefinite period of time in Dillion, Montana, where
she has a full-time business and home. (R. at 128)
2.

Plaintiff states at Page 4 of her brief that 5 ~

resided in an apartment in the motel she had acquired an interes
in.

It should be noted that the Plaintiff testified (R. at

61

;

Tr. at 192, 220) and the court found (R. at 127) that she con. ·ff list
sidered this residence "a regular home." Further Plaintl
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her address in Dillon, Montana when she filled out a "new-patients"
card for or. Charles M. Swindler, an Ogden physician, on February
g, 1977.

(R. at 241)

3.

Plaintiff states at page 5 of her brief that she

obtained professional services in Ogden, Utah.

However, plaintiff

testified (R. at 72-73; Tr. at 195-197) and the court found (R. at
127) that Plaintiff traveled to Ogden for medical and dental care

because she felt that it was superior to that available in Dillon.
Further, Plaintiff testified that except for family visits and
medical treatments in Ogden, she would spend all of her time in
Dillon.

(R. at 75; Tr. at 195).

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
WAS BARRED BY SECTION 5-219(4) IDAHO CODE ANNOTATED AND THEREFORE
BY THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 78-12-45 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.
It is well recognized that statutes of limitation are
deemed procedural rather than substantive and that the law of the
forum applies.
i

Reference must be made to Utah law to determine

whether Plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
Section 78-12-45 Utah Code Annotated provides in pertinent part:
When a cause of action has arisen in another state
or territory, or in a foreign country, and by the
laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be
maintained against a person by reason of a.lap~e
of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained
against him in this state, except in favor of one
who has been a citizen of this state and who has
held the cause of action from the time it accrued.
This provision is a so-called borrowing statute.

It

provides that if a plaintiff files a cause of action in Utah
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which arose in Idaho and which is barred by the Id h
a o Statute
of Limitations, then it is also barred in Utah, u n 1 ess the acti

is brought by a Utah citizen.

If the action is brought bya

citizen of any state other than Utah, it is barred in Utah.
Borrowing statutes are enacted to prevent "forum shopping" and
designed to "shorten the period of limitations applicable to
actions arising in foreign jurisdictions if the foreign juris·
dictions specify a shorter period".

Long v. Pettinato, 230 N,:;

2d 550 (Mich. 1975)' Pack v. Beech Air Craft Corp.

I

132 A.2d s~

(Del. 1957), 53 CJS §31, Limitation of Actions.
The parties stipulated and the district court took
judicial notice that Idaho has a two-year statute of limitation
for personal injuries.

Section 5-219 (4) Idaho Code Annotated

provides:
5-219. Actions against officers, for penalties, or
bonds, and for professional malpractice or for personal injuries.--Within two (2) years:

* * *
( 4.) An action to recover damages for professional
malpractice, or for an injury to the person, or for
the death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect
of another, including any such action arising from
breach of an implied warranty or implied covenant;
The Plaintiff in this case claims she was injured on
January 27, 1974, in the State of Idaho.
· ·
·
has a two-year statute of limitations.

The State of Idaho
Clearly then, on the

face of Plaintiff's complaint, Plainti· ff i· s barred by the Idaho
elevant provision;
Statute of Limitations, and therefore by the r
of §78-12-45 Utah Code Annotated.
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Plaintiff claims that she is a citizen of Utah and that
therefore §78-12-45 does not bar her claim.

However, an examination

of the evidence in this case supports the court's findings and
conclusion that Plaintiff was and is a citizen of the state of
Montana.

Therefore her claim is barred by the Utah Statute of

Limitations, which barrows the two year Idaho Statute of Limitations.
A.

Citizenship is synonymous with domicile.

There is no Utah case which discusses what constitutes
s~te

citizenship within the meaning of §78-12-45 Utah Code

Annotated.

Utah's provision is identical to Idaho's statute,

which similarly does not have a discussion of the term state

m citizenship.

Consequently, it is necessary to examine other

authorities for the elements of state citizenship.
It is generally recognized that state citizenship is
synonymous with domicile.

Janzen v. Goos, 302 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.

1962), Webb v. Nolan, 361 F. Supp. 418

(N.C. 1972), Keelin v.

~,

165 S.W.2d 232 (1942), Ogden v. Ogden, 33 So.2d 870 (Fla.

1948).

For example, the federal decisions uniformly hold that

:t citizenship for determining diversity of citizenship jurisdiction

is domicile. Kaufman and Broad, Inc. v. Gootrad, 397 F. Supp.
1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), Webb v. Nolan, 361 F. Supp. 418 _(D. N.C.
1972), Ellis v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. 325 F. 2d 996 (8th Cir.

1964) •
ho
ini

The case authority is consistant with 25 Am. Jur. 2d
Domicile §11, which similarly states that citizenship is synonymous with domicile:
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Where citizenship is used to refer to an · d'
.
h.ip to one of the states of thin lV·
i. d ua l' s re 1 ations
United States, the term is generally synonymouse
with the term domicile, whether for the purpose
~f ~et7rm~ning jurisdiction of a Federal Court,
Jurisdiction of state courts over divorce or
alimony actions, or any other purpose. On the
other hand, citizenship when used in the sense of
nationality, referring to an individual's relationship to a country may not be the same as
domicile. Id. at 10.
(Emphasis added)
B.

Domicile is based on residence and intent to remai

for an indefinite period of time.
It is important to observe the distinction between mer:
residence and domicile.

The court in Gootrad supra. , explains"

To be a citizen of a state, a person must
be domiciled in a state. Domicile is based on
residence and an intention to remain for an
indefinite period of time. Id. at 1055. (Emphasis
added)
American Jurisprudence states in similar terms:
The intention necessary for acquisition of a
domicile may not be an intention of living in the
locality as a matter of temporary expediancy. It
must be an intention to live permanently or indefinitely in that place. But it need not be an
intention to remain for all time; it is sufficient
if the intention is to remain for an indefinite
period. Supra at 19.
(Emphasis added)
It should be noted that domicile is presumed to follow residency
as the court ruled in Jizmejian v. Jizmejian, 492 P.2d 1208 (Ari:
1972) :
Domicile is presumed to follow residency and
as actual residency is one circumstance, ~he
presumption raised thereby is not conclusive,
but is rebutable and the burden of proof to
.
rebut this resum tion is on the erson contentin
the contrary. Id. at 1211.
Emphasis added
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c.
~rates

Under Utah law, if a person has a residence and

a principal business in another state, he loses Utah

~idency.

In determining what constitutes residency, there is
little Utah law available.

However, as plaintiff states, Title

20-2-14 (1) Utah Code Annotated provides:

(f) If a person removes to another state with the
intention of making it his principal place of business, he loses his residence in this state.
(g) If a person removes to another state with the
intention of remainin there for an indefinite time
as a place o permanent residence, he loses his
residence in this state notwithstanding he entertains
an intention of returning at some future period.
(i) A change of residence can only be made by an
act of removal joined with the intent to remain in
another place. There can only be one residence.
A residence cannot be lost until another is gained.
D.

Intent to acquire domicile is to be determined by

the parties' conduct and declarations.
While intention is important in determining domicile,
it is clear that statements of intent are entitled to little
weight when in conflict of the facts.
418 (D. N. C. 19 7 2) •

Webb v. Nolan, 361 F. Supp.

For example, the court in Gardner v. Gardner,

118 Ut. 496, 22 p. 2d 1055 (1950), ruled that intent is inferred from conduct as well as declarations:
[T]he purchase of a home in another state is
evidence which has a strong bearing on the question
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of intention to abandon the existi'ng
· ·
_ d omicile
and
to adopt one at the site of the home
Id. at 501.*
so acquir~·
The court in Ellis v. New Amersterdan Cas. Co., 325 F. 2d 996
(8th Cir. 1964) noted that there are numerous factors to consic
in determining a party's intent to acquire domicile:
Among the circumstances usually relied upon
to 7s~ablish the requisite intent to establish
domic7le are th7 ~eclarations of a party, the
exercise of political rights, payment of personal
taxes, a house of residence, and a lace of
business.
Id. at 801.
emphasis added
American Jurisprudence concurs in stating that intent
is not to be determined merely from the stated intent of the
parties.

In determining that intent, courts look to (1) the

exercise of voting or other civil and political rights in a
certain place;

( 2) the payment of taxes which are generally

deemed to be assessable at the domicile of the taxpayer; (3) th
securing of licenses ordinarily required of residence, such as
automobile licenses and business permits;
business, profession or occupation;

(4) the place of one'

(5) where one owns the hous

*The court in Gardner found that the purchase of a home in
California was not conclusive evidence of a change of domicile. Contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, however, intent
was not the controlling factor in the decision. Th7 co~rt
found that there were many other factors, and that ii:i ":17w
of all the facts, those factors outweighted the acquis1t1o~ s
of a new home. Those factors included that:
(l} the partie
were in California only three weeks; (2) the partie7 had not
moved into the new home, or established it as a residence,
and would not do so until it was remodeled; (3} the major
personal effects remained in Utah; and (4) the expressed
intention of the plaintiff not to abandon her hc;>me ~n uta~~er
Gardner at 118 Utah 501. Obviously, the situatioi:i in~
is different from the present case where the parties hav7
a residence and operated a business for over four years in
Montana.
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in which he is living and/or the purchase of a residence in another

state; (6) a person's church activities, his social life, and
membership in social and fraternal

organizations~

25 Am. Jur.

2a Domicile, §94-100.

It should be emphasized that the intent need not be
permanent.

As Plaintiff notes in her brief, the RESTATEMENT

(Second) of CONFLICTS, Section 18 (1970) provides:
To acquire a domicile of choice in a place,
a person must intend to make that place his home,
for the time at least.
(Emphasis added)
From the foregoing then, it can be concluded that:
1.

Domicile is synonymous with citizenship.

2.

Domicile is based on residence and an intent to

remain for an indefinite period of time.
3.

Under Utah law, if a person moves to another state

with the intention of remaining there for an indefinite time as
a place of permanent residence, he loses residence in Utah.
Further, if a person moves to another state with the intention
of making it his principal place of business, he loses his

residence in this State.
4.

There can only be one residence.

In determining whether a party has an intent to

remain for an indefinite period of time, the courts look to the
declaration of the party and his conduct including:
(a)

Where the party resides;

(b)

Where the party conducts or operates a
business;

(c)

Where the party votes;
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Where the party pays taxes;

(e)

Where the party conducts social

or cominunit·'i

activities;

(f)

Where the party acquires state licenses and/;:
permits; and

(g)

Where the party attends church.

An examination of the record in this case demonstrates that the

court correctly ruled that plaintiff is domiciled in the State c:
Montana and is a citizen of that state:
l.

In August of 1972, the Plaintiff and her husband

purchased an ownership interest in a motel in Dillon, Montana,
(Tr. at 190-191; R. at 127).
2.

Plaintiff and her husband voluntarily moved from

Ogden, Utah, to Dillon, Montana, in August of 1972, to manage anc
operate the motel business.

Plaintiff continually claims in her

brief that "it was never her intent to remain indefinitely in
Montana."

(See Plaintiff's brief at p.5)

However, the trial

court's Findings clearly indicate that the Allens had an intentk
to remain in Montana for an indefinite period of time.

(R.

at

127-128) Those findings are presumed to be supported by the evidt
and will not be disturbed on appeal, particularly when a party
has not timely objected to the findings at the trial level.
Westerfield v. Coop., 6 Utah 2d 262, 311 P.2d 787 (1957), ~
v. Wixom, 123 Utah 103, 255 P.2 d 11 8 (1953) ·

Further this court

has ruled that where the trial court's findings and judgment

'd
e wewE
"are based on substantial, competent, admissible evi enc '
(Utah,
not disturb them." Fisher v. Taylor, Osborn, _ P · 2d
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3.

The management and operation of the motel required

that plaintiff and her husband live in Dillon and be engaged full
time in that business activity.

However, they could have hired

someone else to manage and operate the motel.

Before and after

they moved to Montana, they have had the intention to manage and
operate the motel and reside in the motel for an indefinite period
of time. (Tr. at 195; R. at 127)
4.

From August, 1972, to the present, the Plaintiff

and her husband have resided in a unit of the motel, which the

plaintiff considered a "regular home." (Tr. at 192, 220; R. at 67,
127)

5.

From August 1972, until trial, Plaintiff made occa-

sional visits to her family in Ogden, Utah.

Plaintiff also

obtained medical and dental treatment in Ogden, Utah, which
Plaintiff deemed superior to that available in Dillon, Montana.
Plaintiff's only reason to travel to Ogden is to visit family
members and obtain medical treatment.

(Tr. at 195-197; R. at

71, 72)

6.

Plaintiff became a member of a ward of the L.D.S.

Church in Dillon, Montana.
7.

Plaintiff became a member of the Dillon, Montana

Relief Society.
8.

(Tr. at 192; R. at 67, 127)

(Tr. 192; R. 67, 127)

Since moving to Montana, Plaintiff has paid her

tithing to the L.D.S. Church in Dillon, Montana.

(Tr. at 192;

R. 67 I 127)

9.

From August, 1972 until trial, Plaintiff and her

husband have
filed Montana State income tax returns· (Tr· at 194 i
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R. at 70, 127)
10.

Plaintiff and her husband do not file a Utah

State income tax return.
11.

(Tr. at 194; R. at 70, 128)

Plaintiff and her husband have Montana State

license plates on their automobile, and pay Montana
fees and personal property taxes.
12.

s tate

licen:

(R. at 127)

Plaintiff claims she will return to Ogden, Utah a:

some indefinite time in the future to reside.

She also claims

she will continue to reside for an indefinite period of time in
Dillon, Montana, where she has a full-time business and home.
(Tr. at 195; R. at 128)
In response to this evidence of Montana domicile, Plai:I
relies on the fact that (1) she owns real property in Utah; (2)
she obtains medical and dental treatment in Utah; and (3) she
voted in Utah prior to 1972.

Much of this reliance is misplacec

To being with, the record shows that while Plaintiff owns a
house in Utah, she does not reside there.

The plaintiff's

daughter and her daughter's husband reside in the house.
(R. at 127)

This is a significant fact.

can only be one residence.

Under Utah law, there

Plaintiff has admitted that from

to the present her residence was Dillon, Montana.

rn:

Therefore,

Plaintiff cannot be domiciled in Utah because she does not
reside in Utah.

Plaintiff has chosen for an indefinite period

of time to make her home, to reside, to operate her business,
Wh'1l
and to conduct social and religious activities in Montana.
she has an indefinite intention to return to Utah, t h e
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and the court so found, that Plaintiff resides in Montana and
has

50

resided from 1972 to the present.

(R. at 127-128)

The record further shows that obtaining Utah medical
and dental treatment is not significant.

The Plaintiff testified,

and the court found, that Plaintiff simply thought that professional services in Ogden, Utah, were superior to that .in Dillon,
Montana.

(Tr. at 195-197, R. at 72, 73, 127)
Plaintiff's final claim to Utah domicile is the fact

that she voted in Utah after moving to Dillon.

There is no question

that this conduct is relevant evidence of intent to continue
to be domiciled in Utah.
l:1

However, that evidence is not dispositive

when it is balanced against the evidence of Montana domicile.
Plaintiff voted in Utah, but she resides in and operates a business
in Dillon.

Under Utah law, these two facts preclude Utah residence.

Further, Plaintiff conducts social and religious activities in
Dillon.

She pays property and income taxes and she has obtained

Montana automobile and business licenses.

Plaintiff claims that

many of these activities are not voluntary.

This argument loses

its substance when the court considers that Plaintiff voluntarily
left Utah to reside and operate a business in Dillon.
testified (Tr. at

195~

Plaintiff

R. at 128) that she could hire someone

else to manage the motel.

However, Plaintiff voluntarily has

chosen to operate the business herself.

That voluntary choice

to leave Utah and reside and operate a business in Dillon for

li

over four years is hardly conducive to the Utah residence and

na:

d~icile plaintiff claims.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the District Court should be aff'

'

urned. :

Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing Respondent's
Brief was served this

day of December, 19 77, by mailing on

said date a copy thereof by United States Mail, first class post·
prepaid addressed to Richard Richards, Attorney for Appellant,
2506 Madison Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401.
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